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BOOK REVIEW 
Disability, Employment Policy, and the 
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INTRODUCTION 
After only twelve days in office, President George W. Bush announced the 
"New Freedom Initiative" (NFI), I a domestic policy program aimed at "tearing 
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comments, and am grateful to Ashley Handwerk (2004), Holland Tahvonen (2003), and 
librarian Fred Dingledy for their outstanding assistance. Although my research was 
sponsored by NIDRR grant number Hl33F010012, the views presented herein are my own. 
I. The full text can be accessed online through the White House's website: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/freedominitiative/freedominitiative.html (last visited Oct. 
13, 2002) [hereinafter NFI Online Text]. 
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down the barriers to equality"2 facing the nation's fifty-four million citizens 
with disabilities.3 The press conference, convened at the White House, was 
imbued with indicia of the Chief Executive's commitment to, and empathy 
with, disabled Americans. Mr. Bush issued his remarks while seated behind a 
low wooden dais, positioning himself at eye level with the audience, all of 
whom used wheelchairs.4 The President also made special reference to the 
slightly elevated ramped path leading to the East Room, remarking that the 
topography originated in the removal of stairs "so that Franklin Roosevelt"-
whose wheelchair use was consciously concealed from the public during his 
terms of office, 5 and later ignominiously disregarded by Congress when 
designating a memorial in his honor6-"could make it to his place ofwork."7 
Beyond the obvious significance of its timing relative to Mr. Bush's tenure 
in office, the NFI could hardly have been proposed at a more opportune 
moment. The announcement came in the wake of criticisms of the employment 
provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),9 a civil rights statute 
passed during George H.W. Bush's term in office.IO Moreover, the President's 
2. !d. 
3. !d. The Census Bureau classifies nearly 20% of Americans as having some kind of 
disability. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Census Brief 97-5, Disabilities Affect 
One-Fifth of All Americans, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/3/97pubs/cenbr975.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 13, 2002). Demographic data for the disabled population can be found at 
the Current Population Survey's website, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disability.html 
(last visited Oct. 13, 2002). The complex issues of who counts as "disabled," and whether 
there ought even to be a univocal definition of that classification, goes well beyond the scope 
of this work. 
4. See David E. Sanger, With Conciliatory Gestures, Bush Reaches Out in Reprise of 
Successful Clinton Tactic, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2001, at Al7. In doing so, the President was 
honoring a sensible, albeit frequently neglected, courtesy. See CITY OF SAN ANTONIO 
DISABILITY ACCESS OFFICE, DISABILITY ETIQUETTE HANDBOOK, available at 
http://www.sanantonio.gov/planningldisability _handbook!deh5.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 
2002). A humorous take on disabled/nondisabled interaction is JoHN CALLAHAN, DoN'T 
WORRY, HE WON'T GET FAR ON FOOT 190 (1989) (cataloging social taboos, including 
"acting like Leo Buscaglia"). 
5. The decisive treatment is HUGH GREGORY GALLAGHER, FOR's SPLENDID 
DECEPTION: THE MOVING STORY OF ROOSEVELT'S MASSIVE DISABILITY AND THE INTENSE 
EFFORTS TO CONCEAL IT FROM THE PUBLIC (3d ed. 1999). 
6. This was done much to the consternation of various disability rights groups. See, 
e.g., David Stout, Roosevelt Heirs Try to Calm Furor over Memorial, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 
1997, at A9. Ultimately, a life-sized statue of Roosevelt sitting in a wheelchair 
commissioned for the memorial and paid for by private donations was unveiled four years 
later. See Nelly Tucker, A Wheelchair Gains a Place at FDR Memorial, WASH. POST, Jan. 
7, 2001, at Cl. 
7. See President George W. Bush, Remarks in Announcement of New Freedom 
Initiative (Feb. I, 2001), at http://usinfo.state.gov/usalablelbush0201.htm. 
8. The criticism came mostly on the question of the ADA's efficacy. See generally 
Michael Ashley Stein, Empirical Implications of Title 1, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1671 (2000) 
(reviewing and critiquing the conflicting studies). 
9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12,001 (West 2002). 
10. See generally JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A 
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intention of stringently safeguarding his father's legacy was clearly 
pronounced: "Wherever a door is closed to anyone because of a disability, we 
must work to open it. Wherever any job or home, or means of transportation is 
unfairly denied because of a disability, we must work to change it."! I In 
consequence, the NFI's scope is ambitious, encompassing goals that range from 
alternative means of public transportation to greater home ownership for people 
with disabilities.12 
Yet, despite setting forth a promising agenda aimed at improving the 
relative economic and social position of Americans with disabilities 
(implementing some policy features that have been promoted by myself13 and 
others14 over the past decade), the dynamic underlying the NFI is troubling. 
For in seeking to incorporate people with disabilities into mainstream society, 
the initiative at times places the onus of integration squarely upon the disabled. 
To illustrate, central to the section entitled "Integrating Americans with 
Disabilities into the Workplace"l5 (and played up considerably at the press 
conference)I6 is a proposal to increase "telework" (meaning long-distance 
computer-assisted commuting) for disabled workers by "guarantee[ing] low-
income loans for people with disabilities to purchase equipment to telecommute 
from home."17 As a general proposition, it is difficult to overestimate the 
importance and centrality of employment!& both for workers with disabilities,I9 
NEW CiVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993); Michael Ashley Stein, From Crippled to Disabled: 
The Legal Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, 43 EMORY L.J. 245 (1994) (reviewing 
SHAPIRO, supra). Also passed during the first Bush's presidency was the Civil Rights Act of 
1991,42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 2002). 
II. For the full text, see Bush, supra note 7. Unstated were some odd parallels. For 
instance, after signing the ADA into law, the elder Bush leaned over and kissed quadriplegic 
Evan Kemp on the head. See Stein, supra note 10, at 248. After proposing the NFI, Bush the 
younger kissed quadriplegic Jim Mullen on the cheek. See Sanger, supra note 4. 
12. See NFI Online Text, supra note 1. 
!3. Initially as President of the National Disabled Bar Association. For recent 
(academic) treatments, see Michael Ashley Stein, Disability and Post-ADA Employment 
Effects: Alternative Approaches to Traditional Economic Analysis, in EMERGING 
WORKFORCE ISSUES: W.l.A., TICKET TO WORK, AND TRANSITION 95 (L. Robert McConnell 
ed., 2001); Stein, supra note 8. 
14. Among the more notable analyses are Marjorie L. Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve 
Its Employment Goals?, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. PoL. & Soc. SCI. 37 (1997); Richard V. 
Burkhauser, Post-ADA: Are People with Disabilities Expected to Work?, 549 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 71 (1997). 
15. See NFI Online Text, supra note 1. 
16. See Sanger, supra note 4; Bush, supra note 7. 
17. See NFI Online Text, supra note 1. 
18. "In the modem world, a life with neither job nor money cannot be a life of 
dignity." Kwame Anthony Appiah, Liberalism, Individuality, and Identity, 27 CRITICAL 
1/'IQUIRY 305,331 (2001). 
19. The paradigmatic argument is Gregory S. Kavka, Disability and the Right to Work, 
in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS 
AND INSTITUTIONS 174 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000). Interesting 
variations have lately arisen. See, e.g., AmyL. Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, 8 VA. 
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and those without.20 Certainly, increasing telecommuting and other 
employment options for disabled workers is a laudable21 and much needed22 
policy goal. But the NFI's proposal, framed in terms of "integrating" disabled 
workers, may reify a key misperception that segregates these individuals from 
the general workforce population.23 For in seeking to remedy disabled-labor 
market exclusion by diminishing technological equipment expenses (a dubious 
proposition in light of the disabled poverty level24 and the complete absence of 
targeted job programs to assist them25) the NFI implies that what keeps people 
with disabilities unemployed is their inherent impairments, rather than 
artificially exclusionary practices. 26 Thus, one logical implication of the NFI' s 
statement of policy is that in order to participate in the mainstream societal 
function of work, people with disabilities must further adapt themselves to its 
established routines. 
J. Soc. POL'Y. & L. 477 (2001) (arguing that not only should individuals capable of any 
gainful employment be required to work, but that society has a duty to so assist them). 
20. Vicki Schultz makes these arguments with intelligence and insight in Life's Work, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000). 
21. As a means of, among other advances, narrowing the digital divide. See generally 
Peter D. Blanck & Leonard A. Sandler, ADA Title 111 and the Internet: Technology and Civil 
Rights, 24 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 855 (2000); Mary L. Dispenza, 
Overcoming a New Digital Divide: Technology Accommodations and the Undue Hardship 
Defense Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 159 (2002). 
22. The overall unemployment figures hover at about 50%. See Current Population 
Survey, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disable/cps (last visited Oct. 13, 
2002). 
23. I outline several in Michael Ashley Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality, and Workers 
with Disabilities, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 314 (2000). For a broader perspective, see 
Harlan Hahn, Toward a Politics of Disability: Definitions, Disciplines, and Policies, 22 Soc. 
SCI. J. 87 (1985). 
24. According to the Census Bureau, some 21.4% of those aged 25-64 subsist in 
poverty, compared to 8.3% of nondisabled people. See CENSUS BUREAU, Americans with 
Disabilities: 1997 tbi.A, in HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 
70 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disable/sipp/disab97/asc97.html. 
25. See generally Stein, supra note 8. Bob Dole's attempt to pass a job training 
program aimed at bringing disabled workers into the labor force was a noble effort in this 
regard. See generally Bob Dole, Are We Keeping America's Promises to People with 
Disabilities?, 79 IOWA L. REV. 925 (1994). For ongoing research, see Peter D. Blanck, 
Leonard A. Sandler, James L. Schmeling & Helen A. Schatz, The Emerging Worliforce of 
Entrepreneurs with Disabilities: Preliminary Study of Entrepreneurship in Iowa, 85 IOWA L. 
REv. 1583 (2000); Peter D. Blanck, Leonard A. Sandler, & James L. Schmeling, A Business 
Case Study of Corporate Culture & Practices in Post-ADA Environment at a Major 
Technology Company (2001) (slide presentation), at http://www.its.uiowa.edu/law/lhpdc/ 
researchlresearchdocs/TechCo_present.ppt; Peter D. Blanck & Helen A. Schartz, Emerging 
Worliforce Issues: WIA, Ticket to Work and Transition (2000) (report for the 22d Mary 
Switzer Memorial Seminar), available at http://www.mswitzer.org/semOO/papers/ 
blanck.html; LAW, HEALTH POLICY & DISABILITY CTR., l.T. WORKS PROJECT, at 
http://www. its. uiowa.edu/law /lhpdc/researchlprojects/it_ works.html. 
26. The inverse assumption, which many disability rights advocates believe animates 
the ADA, is discussed infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. 
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This notion, that individuals who have historically been categorized as 
"disabled" ought to fit seamlessly into the modern workplace (if they are to fit 
at all), is central to Ruth O'Brien's recent and provocative book, Crippled 
Justice: The History of Modern Disability Policy in the Workplace. O'Brien 
contends that the "whole man"27 concept of vocational rehabilitation developed 
during the 1950s and 1960s to "treat" the disabled instantiated the notion that it 
is people with disabilities, rather than society, that must change. It is to the 
intellectual, political, and juridical development of this schema that I now turn. 
Part I examines the historical underpinnings of the whole man schema and 
the ways in which O'Brien asserts that it influences Supreme Court opposition 
to disability-related employment rights. Part II provides an overview of recent 
scholarship on the Court's ADA jurisprudence and places Crippled Justice 
within the context of these studies. Finally, Part III critiques O'Brien's 
averments about the Court's jurisprudence and offers an alternative metric with 
which to understand these rulings. 
I. THE "WHOLE MAN" SCHEMA 
According to O'Brien, modern disability· employment practices are 
influenced by vocational rehabilitation policies that only integrate disabled 
workers who have fully adapted themselves to the workplace. One 
consequence of this normative schema, which O'Brien avers influences judicial 
attitudes towards people with disabilities, is Supreme Court resistance to 
disability rights, especially the ADA's employment provisions. 
A. An Epistemic Community of Rehabilitation 
In Crippled Justice, O'Brien traces the legislative history and implications 
of disability employment provisions from their World War II origins to the 
present.28 Medical advances made during World War II, including the 
development of diagnostic tests and new techniques in neuro- and urogenital 
surgery,29 resulted in higher survival rates for severely wounded soldiers.30 
27. Pp. 63-87. If using an obviously sexist term that excludes .women is intended by 
O'Brien to demonstrate a point, it is a subtle (or at least not well-enunciated) one. 
28. As background, there is also a small section on the period before World War II. 
Pp. 31-40. 
29. Pp. 40-41; see also ROSEMARY STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 179-80 (2d ed. 1998). A comparison of the impact of infectious diseases on the 
two world wars demonstrates that considerable improvement in disease management was 
made during the latter period. For troops separated from active combat due to disability, 
tuberculosis was the leading cause of death in World War I, the thirteenth in World War II. 
Similarly, some 46,640 World War I deaths were caused by influenza and related ailments 
(e.g., measles and bronchitis) in contrast to 1285 deaths in World War II. 2 INTERNAL 
MEDICINE IN WORLD WAR II: INFECTIOUS DISEASES xiii {John Boyd Coates, Jr. ed., 1963). 
The National Research Council cooperated greatly with the Army during World War II in 
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Influenced by the behavioral revolution in the social sciences lead by Franz 
Boas, the "parent" of modem anthropology,31 and the developments in 
psychoanalysis spearheaded by Karl and William Menninger, who shifted the 
focus of treatment from hospitals back to communities,32 the emergent field of 
rehabilitation medicine focused on treating the personalities of disabled people 
as a means of compensating for their impairments. 33 
Pioneering doctors such as Howard Rusk34 and Henry Kessler,35 sought to 
develop the egos of disabled people to counterbalance the feelings of 
inferiority, hostility, and neurosis which Freud believed to accompany 
disability.36 Moreover, those at the forefront of rehabilitation medicine 
creating many of the medical innovations. I SURGERY fN WORLD WAR II: ACTIVITIES OF 
SURGICAL CONSULTANTS 23 (John Boyd Coates, Jr. ed., 1962). For a description ofmedica1 
advances in neurosurgery, particularly in relation to treating spinal cord injuries, see 
SURGERY fN WORLD WAR II: NEUROSURGERY (John Boyd Coates, Jr., ed. 1959). 
30. Pp. 31-36. This was especially true of paraplegics. 
31. Pp. 37-40. Boas formed the principle that "the behavior of human beings 
everywhere, primitive or civilized, was determined ... by their particular cultural tradition." 
A FRANZ BOAS READER: THE SHAP!NG OF AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY, 1883-1911, at 220-21 
(George W. Stocking, Jr. ed., 1989). Several of his students expanded upon this initial 
notion of a nexus between psychology and culture. See RuTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF 
CULTURE 46 (1934) (suggesting that the interaction between one's behavior and one's 
environment finally emerges into a "consistent pattern of thought and action"); RALPH 
L!NTON, THE CULTURAL BACKGROUND OF PERSONALITY 12 (1945) ("It is the individual's 
interaction with [society and culture] which is responsible for the formation of most of his 
behavior patterns, even his deep-seated emotional responses."); MARGARET MEAD, 
CONT!NUITIES fN CULTURAL EVOLUTION 23 (1964) (stressing the important evolutionary 
contribution, rather than solely his biological addition, that an individual makes to his 
culture). 
32. Pp. 47-48, 50-52. In treating the whole man, the Menninger brothers, along with 
other post-World War II psychiatrists, sought to change psychiatry's perspective by 
identifying "appropriate social and environmental changes that presumably could optimize 
mental as well as physical health." GERALD GROB, THE MAD AMONG Us 195 (1994). In 
conjunction with this broad environmental approach, Karl Menninger focused on "the total 
economics of the personality rather than [viewing the disability] as something alien to the 
patient." ELIZABETH LUNBECK, THE PSYCHIATRIC PERSUASION 118 (1994). Recognizing that 
it was the doctor who must treat the dynamic interplay of the entire person, Franz Alexander 
hypothesized that "[t]he physiological changes accompanying the chronic emotions 
associated with unresolved conflict were the physiological changes that would give rise to 
alterations in structure and to disease." REUBEN F!NE, THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 224 
(1979). Additionally, Flanders Dunbar supported the perspective in rehabilitation medicine 
that emotional illness, which causes a particular physical ailment, must be addressed and 
resolved prior to any resolution of the physical symptoms. See FLANDERS DUNBAR, MIND 
AND BODY: PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDIC!NE 26, 42 ( 194 7). 
33. Pp. 44-45. 
34. See generally HOWARD A. RUSK, REHABILITATION MEDIC!NE (1964). 
35. See generally HENRY H. KESSLER, THE PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES OF 
REHABILITATION (1950); HENRY H. KESSLER, REHABILITATION OF THE PHYSICALLY 
HANDICAPPED (1953). 
36. Pp. 48-50. For illustrations of contemporary perceptions on the mental effects of 
disabling conditions, see, for example, Ruth J. Levy, The Rorschach Pattern in 
Neurodermatitis, 14 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 41, 48 (1952) (finding that "neurodermatitis 
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subscribed to many of the tenets of the Group for Advancement of Psychiatry, 
which emphasized the holistic relationship between the psychological well-
being of individuals and general societal health.37 As a result, rehabilitation 
medicine adopted the goal of restoring a disabled man to a "whole man," an 
improvement that would in turn enhance communal well-being.38 
Through the 1950s, Rusk and Mary Switzer, the director of the federal 
Office of Vocational Rehabilitation, formulated modern disability policy as the 
core of an "epistemic community,"39 a term used by O'Brien to define a group 
of people sharing the same set of beliefs and working towards a common goal 
of fostering and promulgating their knowledge to others.40 Referred to 
euphemistically as "Mr. and Miss Rehabilitation," Rusk and Switzer 
spearheaded the initiation and implementation of federal rehabilitation 
programs controlled by medical experts.41 
One consequence of Rusk and Switzer's medically oriented perspective 
was that the epistemic community of rehabilitation applied a medical model of 
disability.42 Under this framework, disability was pathologized as a biological 
aberration.43 Consequently, the appropriate treatment was to normalize or 
adapt these anomalous individuals to their surroundings.44 To achieve this 
patients tend to show marked signs of repressed hostility"); E. D. Wittkower, Studies of the 
Personality of Patients Suffering from Urticaria, 15 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 116, 123 (1953) 
(determining that urticaria "occurs in individuals who have been or have felt chronically 
deprived of affection"). 
37. Pp. 54-57; see also SOLOMON W. GINSBURG, A PSYCHIATRIST'S VIEWS ON SOCIAL 
ISSUES (1963); GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
OF PSYCHIATRY, A STATEMENT OF ORIENTATION (1950). 
38. Pp. 27-30, 45-48, 60. At the 29th annual meeting of the American College of 
Physicians, Karl Menninger espoused a change in medical treatment by viewing disease "in 
terms of the total economics of the personality." Self-Diagnosis, TIME, May 3, 1948, at 68. 
The whole man schema was later applied even more broadly to the poor. P. 101. 
39. See generally CHAVA WILLIG LEVY, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE INDEPENDENT 
LIVING MOVEMENT (1988); MARTHA LENTZ WALKER, BEYOND BUREAUCRACY: MARY 
ELIZABETH SWITZER AND REHABILITATION (1985). 
40. Pp. 18-20, 71-83. See generally PETER A. HALL, GOVERNING THE ECONOMY: THE 
POLITICS OF STATE INTERVENTION IN BRITAIN & FRANCE 276-80 (1986) ("[T]he social power 
of any set of ideas is magnified when those ideas are taken up by a powerful political 
organization, integrated with other ideological appeals, and widely disseminated."); IDEAS 
AND FOREIGN POLICY (Judith Goldstein & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 1993). 
41. Pp. 22, 27, 71. 
42. Although it would be several decades before the framework was referred to as 
such. See RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2d ed. 2001 ). 
43. And it still is. See Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal 
Protection, and the Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive and 
Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classification, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 81 (2002) 
(describing the continuing influence of outmoded notions). 
44. By contrast, Harlan Hahn, a political scientist from University of Southern 
California and one of the founders of the Disability Studies movement, advocated adapting 
the surrounding environment to meet the needs of the people with disabilities. Hahn 
recognized that "the primary problems confronting citizens with disabilities are bias, 
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goal, teams of professionals and doctors treated the "whole" patient, 
psychologically and physically, in hospital-like rehabilitation centers.45 A 
second consequence of the rehabilitation community's categorical support of 
the whole man theory was its resistance to rights-based legislation, notably 
attempts by activist Paul Strachan to procure an act prohibiting discrimination 
in employment. This disinclination was motivated by dual concerns. First, that 
such entitlements would challenge the epistemic community's goal of 
channeling people with disabilities into the workforce by rehabilitating their 
defects (rather than by forcing employers to hire misfits). Second, that rights-
based legislation would imperil federal funding for vocational rehabilitation 
programs by drawing attention to the practice of focusing their efforts on those 
most likely to succeed.46 
The crowning glory of Rusk and Switzer's combined efforts was adoption 
of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1954 (VRA),47 a key feature of 
President Eisenhower's larger Cold War agenda of developing "nonsocialistic" 
domestic social programs.48 Passage of the VRA resulted in more funds and 
grants for research, construction of rehabilitation centers, training of vocational 
rehabilitation professionals, and the establishment of the National Advisory 
Council on Vocational Rehabilitation.49 
The preference for a rehabilitative (rather than a rights) theory for 
improving the lives of disabled Americans reached a golden age during 
President Johnson's administration, when the VRA was renewed,50 even more 
rehabilitation centers were built, the total federal rehabilitation program budget 
was doubled, and new advisory boards were implemented.51 The building of 
this "rehabilitation empire" peaked in 1967 with the creation of the Social 
prejudice, segregation, and discrimination that can be eradicated through policies designed to 
guarantee them equal rights." Harlan Hahn, Civil Rights for Disabled Americans, in IMAGES 
OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 181, 182 (Alan Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987). 
45. The best known of these centers are named, respectively, after Rusk and Kessler. 
46. Pp. 76-78. 
47. Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-565, 68 Stat. 652 
(1954); see Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the 
Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. 
REV. 1341, 1367-71 (1993) (discussing the importance of the amendments to expansion of 
the rehabilitation movement). 
48. P. 81. 
49. Pp. 81-82, 85. In practical terms, by 1955 there were some 1000 vocational 
rehabilitation trainees at universities nationwide, and by 1960, about 40 universities offered 
related graduate programs. The number of programs would grow to about 100 in 1980. See 
EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, DISABLED POLICY: AMERICA'S PROGRAMS FOR THE HANDICAPPED 
171-72 (1987). 
50. Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-333, 79 Stat. 
1282 (1965). 
51. P.93. 
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Rehabilitation Service, which consolidated all rehabilitation services under one 
roof, with Switzer appointed as its head until she retired in 1970.52 
B. The Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Despite the prevailing penchant for rehabilitation in lieu of rights, O'Brien 
relates how rights were legislated in the end as "an accident ofhistory."53 The 
philosophy of self-determination, developed within the disability context by Ed 
Roberts of the Center for Independent Living in Berkeley, California,54 
inspired disability rights advocates to protest the exclusion of people with 
disabilities from society at large and their concurrent warehousing under 
"inhumane conditions."55 Part of this civil rights scheme was resistance to 
what advocates deemed the paternalistic posture of rehabilitation medicine, one 
they claimed viewed people with disabilities as child-like and unable to care or 
make decisions for themselves. 56 
In contrast to the paternalism of the Rehabilitation Movement, the 
Independent Living Movement, as well as other disability rights groups, 
advocated the independence of disabled people as full and active members of 
society.57 Over time, the progress of this disability rights-based agenda faced 
resistance from an oddly matched political coalition that included the Nixon, 
Ford, and Carter administrations, as well as several civil rights leaders.58 This 
opposition was united by the concern that extending established 
antidiscrimination provisions to the disabled would weaken protections for 
other constituencies. 59 President Carter's decision to preclude passage of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity for the Handicapped Act was motivated by 
similar concerns.60 
The Rehabilitation Act was nonetheless enacted, ironically as a direct 
result of the civil rights movement,6I with antidiscrimination principles 
52. Pp. 98, 100-01. 
53. P. 5. 
54. P. 110. See generally LEVY, supra note 39; SHAPIRO, supra note 10. 
55. P. 110 (quoting Wyatt v. Stickey, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971)). One result 
of this advocacy was the holding in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). There, the 
Court ruled that the State, in protecting an involuntarily committed individual's liberty 
interests in safety and freedom of movement, could restrict those interests only for 
reasonable and legitimate reasons based upon professional judgment. !d. at 324. · 
56. Pp. 109-10. 
57. Pp. 109-10. 
58. Pp. 113, 115-16. 
59. Pp. 115-16, 121-23. 
60. Carter also perceived a distinction between race- and sex-based prohibitions and 
those extended to the disabled, whom he evaluated as "impaired in some abilities and 
function." P. 114. 
61. Pp. 109-17. 
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intact. 62 Introduced by Senator Cranston in large part as an effort to eliminate 
"creaming"-a practice in which employers hire either workers with minimal 
disabilities or only those individuals with disabilities who require the least 
expensive accommodations63_the Rehabilitation Act had a two-prong focus 
on both affirmative action and antidiscrimination.64 Section 501 was directed 
at affirmative action hiring practice for federal agencies,65 section 503 at 
businesses that received governmental contracts.66 Section 504, inserted as a 
gesture of goodwill without full consideration of its import, prohibited 
discrimination by any recipient of federal funds, or any federal agency, against 
"qualified" individuals with disabilities.67 This accidental addition to the 
Rehabilitation Act would prove momentous in shaping its progeny, the ADA. 
Crucial to rights advocates, the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare (HEW, now called Health and Human Services) promulgated 
guidelines interpreting the Rehabilitation Act that defined the central (and 
vague) term "disability" under the Act. 68 The issuance of these HEW 
regulations, however, was greatly resisted by both the Ford and Carter 
administrations. To precipitate their release, disability rights advocates 
engaged in a number of highly publicized protests. Especially visible were the 
April 1977 sit-ins at the ten regional HEW offices to protest then-Secretary 
Joseph Califano's recalcitrant refusal to authorize his own agency's 
regulations.69 The most significant demonstration occurred in San Francisco, 
where protestors remained in the HEW office building without food, attendant 
service, or medical care until Califano, who had authorized the siege-like 
conditions,70 yielded to public pressure and agreed to publish the HEW 
62. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-96 (West 2002)). 
63. See Thomas N. Chirakos, Will the Costs of Accommodating Workers with 
Disabilities Remain Low?, 17 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 93 (1999) (arguing that the likelihood of 
accommodation for disabled workers by employers depends in part on costs). 
64. Although not mutually exclusive, these are far from the same thing. See Michael 
Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as 
Antidiscrimination (2002) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
65. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 501, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) 
(codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 791 (West 2002)) (establishing an affirmative action program in 
hiring, placement, and advancement of people with disabilities throughout the federal 
government and an annual reporting scheme to Congress on the program's status). 
66. Id. § 503 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 793 (West 2002)) (creating an affirmative 
action program for federal government contractors with contracts in excess of $10,000.00 to 
employ people with disabilities). 
67. /d. § 504 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 2002)) (prohibiting discrimination 
against otherwise qualified individuals with a disability). 
68. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiving 
or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1977); see also pp. 125, 
128-30. 
69. Pp. 126-28. 
70. See Stein, supra note 10. 
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guidelines.71 Although Califano's capitulation was an important first step in 
the fight against disability-based discrimination,72 rights advocates were 
disappointed in the Rehabilitation Act's (non)effect upon disabled workers' 
employment. This ineffectiveness was due in large measure to the Supreme 
Court's narrow construction of the legislation, discussed below,73 that reified 
the epistemic rehabilitation community's ideas on normalizing the "whole" 
disabled man. 74 
Remonstrating against these detrimental judicial interpretations, activists 
lobbied to pass a new statute that would expand protections for workers with 
disabilities beyond the pale of the public sector, and be grounded in the type of 
rights framework that had been developed by the disability rights community.75 
Under this "social model" of disability, disabled workers are no longer required 
to adapt perfectly to the job as a means of fitting in.76 Instead, the workplace 
environment and its seemingly "neutral" policies?? are obliged to accommodate 
workers with disabilities as a means of vitiating artificial exclusions that have 
prevailed due to pervasive social attitudes.78 
Enacted by Congress in 1990, the ADA achieved the disability rights 
activists' stated goals. 79 Modeled after existing civil rights statutes, the statute 
was "heralded as the most significant law since the Civil Rights Act of 1964" 
71. Pp. 127 -28; see also RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS 113-
15 (1st ed. 1984) (providing detailed primary-source accounts of the demonstration). 
72. Other steps included a bill from Representative John Brademas and Senator Alan 
Cranston that expanded the current vocational rehabilitation program to the severely 
disabled, and other legislation, such as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-1420 (West 
2002)), that was also enacted. Pp. 118-20. 
73. See infra Part I. C. 
74. Pp. 137-39. 
75. Pp. 165-68. 
76. This altered dynamic is also referred to as the "new paradigm" of disability, one 
that "focuses on taking effective and meaningful actions to 'fix' or modify the natural, 
constructed, cultural, and social environment." Robert Silverstein, Emerging Disability 
Policy Framework: A Guidepost for Analyzing Public Policy, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1691, 1695 
(2000). 
77. For "even if individuals now are chosen for jobs strictly on the basis of their likely 
productivity," this assessment "may reflect past discriminatory practices." Richard J. 
Arneson, Disability, Discrimination and Priority, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 
EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDNIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 19, at 
18; see also Stein, supra note 23, at 329-30 (highlighting the nonneutrality of the 
neoclassical labor market model status quo baseline as applied to disabled workers). 
78. Pp. 166-67. The philosophical underpinnings of this theory are well stated by 
Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES 
ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13 (1998). 
79. The ADA also achieved other goals since the scope of protection extended to state 
and local government, as well as to public accommodation. See generally Robert L. 
Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-
Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413 (1991) (providing an 
overview of the statute, including the motivation behind its passage). 
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(i.e., Title VI1).80 The ADA's employment provisions, contained in Title I, 
were drawn directly from the Rehabilitation Act in "an attempt to provide 
greater relief for people with disabilities" than existed at the time. 8! Moreover, 
the drafters anticipated that using the same language in the ADA would avoid 
definitional difficulties for courts that, presumably, were already familiar with 
their application through Rehabilitation Act claims.82 Accordingly, Title I 
defines a person with a disability as an individual who has either "a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities,"83 has had a history of such an impairment, 84 or is currently regarded 
as having one. 85 Similarly tracking its predecessor, the ADA adopted as a 
condition precedent to statutory protection that a disabled worker be 
"qualified," meaning that she could perform the essential functions of a given 
job, either with or without provision of a required reasonable 
accommodation. 86 
Despite the open-ended nature of these provisions and the optimism with 
which they were greeted, O'Brien avers that the ADA's impact on disability-
related employment has been "profoundly disappointing."87 At the heart of the 
ADA's inefficacy, she claims, is an interpretation by the federal trial courts of 
"disability" that places claimants in a Catch-22: "[E]ither they have such a 
severe disability that they are not qualified to work, or their disability is not 
serious enough to warrant statutory protection."88 This was an issue, according 
to O'Brien, that neither ADA activists nor the business community "could have 
anticipated" as federal courts "switched" their gate-keeping emphasis from 
qualification to coverage by substituting their own judgment for those of 
medical experts. 89 As a result, some eighty percent of Title I claims are 
"thrown out on summary judgment."90 
Nonetheless, as egregious as is this treatment of disabled plaintiffs by the 
lower federal courts, "the Supreme Court went even further," according to 
O'Brien, in limiting their rights in the workplace.91 
80. P. 162. 
81. P. 174. 
82. P. 164. 
83. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A) (West 2002). 
84. !d. § 12,1 02(2)(8). 
85. !d. § 12, I 02(2)(C). 
86. !d. 
87. P. 163. 
88. P. 163. 
89. P. 164. 
90. P. 163. 
91. P. 163. 
Nov. 2002] DISABILITY AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY 619 
C. The Supreme Court and Disability Employment Policy 
According to O'Brien, one consequence of the whole man schema of 
rehabilitation is the Supreme Court's resistance to recognizing and enforcing 
disability rights. This is particularly so with respect to the ADA's employment 
provisions. 
As a preface to discussing the Court's ADA jurisprudence, O'Brien 
describes how the Justices "constrained" disability-related rights prior to the 
ADA's enactment. O'Brien contends that the Court's failure to extend suspect 
or quasi-suspect constitutional protection to the egregiously mistreated 
individuals with mental disabilities92 in either Pennhurst State School & 
Hospital v. Halderman93 (brought under the Developmental Disabilities Act),94 
or City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, lnc.95 (asserting Fourteenth 
Amendment protection),96 was one of the most significant ·Of these setbacks. 
Moreover, in Youngberg v. Romeo,97 the Court held that since legislative 
bodies should balance the needs of individuals with disabilities against the 
"demands of organized society,"98 they are only entitled as a matter of 
constitutional right to minimal care.99 Hence, the Court determined "that 
disabled people did not deserve equal protection under the Fourteenth 
92. Previously, drawing upon the Supreme Court's enullleration of class characteristics 
that triggered strict scrutiny in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 19-20 (1973), and in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973), two 
commentators argued that people with disabilities likewise qualified as a suspect class since 
they were also politically powerless, historically and unfairly discriminated against, and 
(frequently) possessed immutable characteristics. See Marcia Pearce Burgdorf & Robert 
Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons 
as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855, 
902-08 (1975). 
93. 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (reasoning that a funding statute did not guarantee constitutional 
rights to people with disabilities). 
94. Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 
77 Stat. 282, as added Pub. L. No. 94-103, § 6010, 89 Stat. 486, 502 (1976), amended by 
Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 6010, 92 Stat. 2955, 3007 (Supp. IV 1980). 
95. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
96. ld. at 455 (holding that the Cleburne Living Center was wrongly denied a special 
use permit under rational-basis review, but that the mentally retarded are not entitled to 
heightened judicial scrutiny as a suspect or quasi-suspect class); see also pp. 141-44; Silvers 
& Stein, supra note 43 (comparing sex discrimination and disability jurisprudence, as well as 
the nuances and implications of the Cleburne decision). 
97. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
98. Jd. at 320 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). Thus, O'Brien avers that to the Justices "[o]rder, unity, normality, and 
objectivity-the state's interests-were more important than the individual's interests" of 
freedom and security in an institutional setting. Pp. 144-46. 
99. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an involuntarily 
committed individual has constitutional liberty interests in "conditions of reasonable care 
and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be 
required by those interests." Romeo, 457 U.S. at 324; see alsop. 145. 
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Amendment."IOO This view by the Court, which O'Brien characterizes as one 
in which the disabled "have no constitutionally guaranteed rights," was an 
outgrowth of the epistemic rehabilitation movement, and Switzer's influence in 
particular. IOJ 
O'Brien further argues that although the Court did eventually differentiate 
between equality of opportunity, affirmative action, and the reasonable 
accommodation mandates of the Rehabilitation Act, it failed to do so 
appropriately.I02 For, although the latter two theories underscored civil rights, 
the Rehabilitation Act provided for more limited remedies.I03 As a result, 
people with disabilities had some opportunities, but not necessarily ones equal 
to those of the able-bodied.104 Accordingly, in Alexander v. Choate,I05 the 
Court found that reasonable accommodations afforded less relief than 
affirmative action,I06 while in Board of Education v. Rowley,I07 the Court held 
that disabled children were entitled to free, available, and appropriate 
education, but not to education that maximized each child's potential. lOS 
With this restricted view of the rights of the disabled to coexist in society 
firmly in mind, the Court adopted a limited view of reasonable accommodation 
when challenges arose under the Rehabilitation Act. I 09 Thus, in Southeastern 
Community College v. Davis, 110 which went on to become one of the leading 
section 504 decisions, III the Court held that an accommodation was only 
applicable if it did not fundamentally alter or substantially modify the 
underlying program, for to hold otherwise would "constitute an unauthorized 
extension of the obligations imposed by that statute."112 Moreover, in 
100. P. 139. 
101. P. 145. 
I 02. Pp. 150-52. 
103. Pp. 150-52. 
104. P. 151. 
105. 469 u.s. 287 (1985). 
106. P. 150. 
107. 458 u.s. 176 (1982). 
I 08. Pp. 150-51. 
109. P. 147 (analogizing reasonable accommodations to affirmative action, the 
Supreme Court found that reasonable accommodations "imposed less of a burden on an 
institution than programs that had to be changed because they had initially denied (someone] 
equality of opportunity"). 
110. 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (affirming a State college's decision to deny admission to a 
deaf nursing student on the ground that it was unsafe for her to practice or even complete the 
current clinical training program); see alsop. 149. 
Ill. Sometimes infamous due to the circularity of its reasoning. See, e.g., Judith 
Welch Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity 
Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 
CORNELL L. REV. 401, 452-59 (1984) (assessing the Supreme Court's decision in 
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, its analytical framework for "exclusionary 
refusal to accommodate" cases, and its impact upon section 504's antidiscrimination 
mandate). 
112. Davis, 442 U.S. at 410; see also pp. 147-48. 
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emphasizing whether an individual is 'otherwise qualified' under the 
Rehabilitation Act, the Court "encouraged employers to either make light of 
employees' or applicants' disabilities or emphasize their incompetence."! 13 
Worse still, "[t]he Supreme Court widely viewed people with disabilities as 
inferior to those without them, and expressed this view by having them 
shoulder the initial burden of proof in disability law" by requiring claimants to 
demonstrate that they belong to the protected class.ll4 This was especially 
apparent in the Court's first, and some would argue paradigmatic, liS attempt to 
grapple with the Rehabilitation Act's definition of disability in School Board v. 
Arline.116 Affirming a lower court's ruling that a school teacher with currently 
asymptomatic tuberculosis is a "handicapped individual," Justice Brennan 
wrote that although "[s]uch an impairment might not diminish a person's 
physical or mental capabilities," it could still limit substantially the teacher's 
working ability "as a result of the negative reactions of others to the 
impairment."ll7 O'Brien avers that, in so ruling, the Court bolstered society's 
resentment towards people with disabilities by both acknowledging and 
highlighting their differences from the able-bodied mainstream. liS 
In discussing the Court's ADA jurisprudence, O'Brien focuses on the 
Justices' "constraining" interpretation of the definition of disability, one that 
has created "legal dams" against further Title I claims. In making these 
assertions, O'Brien analyzes four of the six ADA decisions handed down at the 
time of publication,119 and how each treats the definition of disability: 
Bragdon v. Abbott,l20 and the troika of Sutton v. United Air Lines,l21 Murphy 
v. UPS, 122 and Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg.l23 In Bragdon, the Court ruled 
that an HIV-asymptomatic woman was disabled on the ground that the risk of 
transmitting her condition to a partner or child limited the major life activity of 
reproduction.124 Although a Title III public-accommodation case unrelated to 
employment, the decision signaled the case-by-case methodology that the Court 
113. P. 147. 
114. P. 139. 
115. See, e.g., Anna Phipps Engh, The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Focusing the 
Definition of a Handicapped Individual, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 149, 168 (1988). 
116. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
117. P. 158 (quoting Arline, 480 U.S. at 283). 
118. P. 157. 
119. She does not, however, address two others decided over the same period: 
Pennsylvania Department of Correction v. Yesky, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) (holding that Title II 
of the ADA applies to state prisons), and Cleveland v. Policy Management System Corp., 
526 U.S. 795 (1999) (ruling that claims for Social Security Disability Insurance and ADA 
damages need not preclude each other). 
120. 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
121. 527 u.s. 471 (1999). 
122. 527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
123. 527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
124. 524 U.S. at 626-28. 
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would adopt when approaching the definition of disability in later cases.125 
The Court in Sutton decided that severely myopic twins who aspired to pilot 
airplanes were not disabled due to the corrective lenses they used to prevent 
substantial limitation of the major life activity of seeing.l26 The opinion "gave 
employers the right to discriminate" against those "with limiting 
impairments."127 Expanding the ruling in Sutton, the Murphy Court held that a 
driver with high blood pressure was not disabled since medication mitigated his 
impairment.128 Thus, Vaughan Murphy was placed in an untenable bind 
wherein he "functioned too well to be thought of as having a disability" while 
also being considered "too sick to perform the job."129 Also relying upon 
Sutton, Kirkingburg held that a truck driver with monocular vision was not per 
se disabled because of mitigating factors. 130 Consequently, the fact that Hallie 
Kirkingburg's body compensated for its own limitation stripped him of ADA 
protecti on.131 
According to O'Brien, the rulings in each of these cases demonstrate the 
influence of the whole man schema of rehabilitation over the individual 
Justices. She therefore relates the Court's analytical approach to the principles 
underlying the vocational rehabilitation movement by drawing parallels 
between the perspectives of the judiciary and those of the epistemic 
rehabilitation community.132 Just as rehabilitation experts possessed a 
functionalist view of people with disabilities, "judges do not recognize that 
persons have a disability because they have a specific impairment, but [only] if 
this condition substantially interferes with [or limits] a significant aspect of 
their lives."133 In considering how people with disabilities mitigate their 
impairments, the Justices compared the disabled to able-bodied persons, 
thereby invoking the normalizing goal of the rehabilitation movement.134 
Additionally, the Court afforded ADA protection only to those people with 
disabilities whose impairments substantially limited a major life activity.135 
For O'Brien, the consequence of.this standard is that people with disabilities 
who have mitigated the impact of their impairments are considered "whole." 
ADA protection is therefore, in the Court's view, unnecessary as well as over-
compensatory for those types of individuals.136 By contrast, those who have 
125. P. 189. 
126. 527 U.S. at 477. 
127. Pp. 192-98. 
128. Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516, 520 (1999). 
129. P. 200. 
130. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 557 (1999). 
131. Pp. 199-200. 
132. The analysis that follows amalgamates arguments that appear, but are not well 
organized, in the text of the book. 
133. P. 208 (emphasis added). 
134. P. 210. 
135. P. 164. 
136. P. 199. 
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not reached "whole" status are taken under the paternalistic wing of the state 
since they cannot fully be citizens without legal intervention.137 
II. (RE)ASSESSING SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
Over the last few years the Supreme Court has handed down an increasing 
number of ADA rulings,l38 the majority of which raise, directly or indirectly, 
employment-related issues.l39 Consequently, a number oflegal commentators 
have analyzed these decisions, positing different explanations for 
understanding the Court's growing jurisprudence,l40 This literature can be 
organized into three broad categories, each of which analyzes the Court's 
decisions from a greater degree of theoretical abstraction.141 Taken as a whole, 
they examine the (a) lack of harmony between the ADA's stated goals and its 
practical effects; 142 (b) discomfort the Justices have in understanding the group 
of people called "disabled" by Title I and the attendant effect upon application 
of the statute; 143 and (c) underlying principles the Justices seem to be striving 
for as well as those goals the ADA ought to effectuate.144 
Entering this debate from the perspective of a political scientist, O'Brien's 
thesis is provocative and ambitious. She provides a welcome addition to this 
literature by proffering an even more theoretical level: one that examines the 
effect of a specific intellectual milieu (here, the epistemic rehabilitation 
137. P. 211. 
138. Leading Justice O'Connor to remark that the 2002 Court session would be 
"remembered as the disabilities act term." See Charles Lane, 0 'Connor Criticizes 
Disabilities Law as Too Vague, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2002, at A2. 
139. Specifically, the Court has issued rulings in six cases directly raising Title I 
claims. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002); U.S. Airways, Inc. 
v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 
(2002); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 557 (1999); Murphy v. UPS, 527 
U.S. 516, 520 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). Three 
indirectly raise Title I claims. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); Bd. of 
Trs. ofUniv. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 
526 U.S. 795 (1999). Five others raise non-employment issues. See Barnes v. Gorman, 122 
S. Ct. 2097 (2002); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001); Olmstead v. L.C. ex rei. 
Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Pa. Dep't ofCorrs. 
v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998). 
140. These are discussed infra Part ll.A-C. I have not included Mark Kelman's work 
(which I very much admire, but with which I do not always agree) in the textual discussion 
for the reason that it focuses exclusively on Bragdon, at least so far as Supreme Court 
decisions are concerned. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 833 (2001) (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), to demonstrate the 
Supreme Court's confusion in determining which individuals are protected by the ADA). 
141. Of course, there are many different ways to approach this literature, but I will 
utilize this scheme to facilitate the essay portion that follows. 
142. See infra Part Il.A. 
143. See infra Part Il.B. 
144. See infra Part II.C. 
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community) upon the federal judiciary and, in particular, the Justices of the 
Supreme Court. In order to evaluate O'Brien's critique of modem disability 
jurisprudence, it is necessary to place her arguments in the context of other 
scholarly modes of assessment, each of which will now be examined. 
A. The ADA as a Disharmonious Statute 
In a jointly written article, Samuel Issacharoff and Justin Nelson attempt to 
reconcile the Court's jurisprudence with the ADA's statutory scheme.I45 They 
argue that the Court's decisions in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg reflect the 
Justices' inability to harmonize the ADA's antidiscrimination mandates with its 
redistributive effects.I46 First, this is because, unlike Title VII, the ADA is 
primarily redistributive rather than prohibitive of discrimination.147 Second, 
the ADA does not fund or create risk distribution among employers or 
taxpayers for its associated costs.l48 
It can also be argued that Congress was negligent in drafting the ADA 
when it adopted wholesale (in part as the result of a political compromise 
among cross-disability rights groups and groups who represented people with 
specific disabilitiesl49) the definition of disability from the Rehabilitation 
Act. I 50 For although the definition itself was meant to be neutral, the socio-
legal-cultural accretion of established welfarist classifications continued to 
influence post-ADA Supreme Court decisions. I 51 In other words, because the 
ADA followed so closely on the Rehabilitation Act, the Justices continued to 
assume that the targeted population should equally be characterized as 
incompetent.152 The Court therefore extended the Rehabilitation Act's 
inference that the disabled needed rehabilitation to fit into society to those 
individuals who asserted ADA claims.153 
145. See Samuel lssacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can 
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 
N.C. L. REV. 307 (2001). 
146. /d. at 338-39. 
147. /d. I strenuously disagree with this assertion in Stein, supra note 64. 
148. Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 145, at 340-41. 
149. See generally Burgdorf, supra note 79; Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential 
Requirements oft he Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 4 71 (1991 ). 
150. This argument is drawn from Silvers & Stein, supra note 43, and Anita Silvers & 
Michael Ashley Stein, From Plessy (1896) and Goesart (1948) to Cleburne (1985) and 
Garrett (2001): A Chill Wind from the Past Blows Equal Protection Away, in BACKLASH 
AGAINST THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS 
(Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., forthcoming 2002). 
151. See sources cited supra note 150. 
152. See sources cited supra note 150. 
153. See sources cited supra note 150. 
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B. The Justices and the Disabled: Discomfort 
A vi am Soifer has contributed two accounts of how the current Justices do 
not relate to the group of individuals with disabilities targeted by the ADA. 
First, he has argued that the Court's ADA interpretations reflect a lack of 
concern for the pet;sonal dignity of people with disabilities.154 As such, he 
criticizes the Justices for hypocritically proclaiming the need to make 
individualized assessments of those seeking ADA protection, while at the same 
time not considering as individual people the disabled plaintiffs themselves.155 
Soifer also asserts that the Court's rulings reveal a "stealth strategy" in which 
only narrow, easily restricted instances of ADA coverage that grab public 
attention are upheld.156 Meantime, a majority of the Justices remain firmly 
unconvinced that the disabled require (or even deserve) legal protection.157 
An alternative but complementary explanation is that the Justices are 
generally unfamiliar with disabl~d Americans due, in part, to their unique civil 
rights chronology.158 Unlike other marginalized groups, people with 
disabilities were empowered by legislation before a general elevation of social 
consciousness about their circumstances and capabilities.159 Thus it is not 
entirely surprising that the Court's view of the disabled, much like the view of 
society at large, does not conform to the spirit of the statute's legislative 
findings or to the letter of assertions made by disability rights advocates.160 
C. The Justices and the ADA: Underlying Principles 
Samuel Bagenstos offers three distinct attempts at gleaning the principles 
that either underlie or ought to motivate the Court's ADA jurisprudence. First, 
he argues that the Court's definition of disability could be seen as by and large 
extending ADA protection only to those individuals subject to disability-related 
stigma that subjects them to systematic disadvantage.161 This "antisubordi-
154. See Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative 
Capability, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1279 (2000). 
155. /d. 
156. Aviam Soifer, Essences, Better Angels, and the ADA: Accommodating the Public 
Interest, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2003). 
157. /d. Susan Stefan extends this assertion, arguing that society in general has a 
similar perception of individuals with mental disabilities that are not apparently visible. See 
Susan Stefan, The Two Worlds of Psychiatric Disability: "Discredited," "Discreditable, " 
and the Identities of Disabled People, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. (forthcoming 2003). 
158. See SHAPIRO, supra note I 0; Stein, supra note 10. 
159. See Drimmer, supra note 47; Richard K. Scotch, Politics and Policy in the History of 
the Disability Rights Movement, 67 MILBANK Q. 380 (1989). 
160. Perhaps, then, the Title I win/loss statistics cited by O'Brien might be a partial 
answer to the rhetorical question posed almost a decade ago: "What happens when Congress 
grants a new group minority rights, but society has little understanding that those rights have 
been awarded or why they are needed?" SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 323. 
161. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L. 
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nationist" approach confonns to accepted constitutional theory, and is also 
coherent with other civil rights legislation.162 Alternatively, the Court's 
decisions can be viewed through the lens of risk regulation.163 When balancing 
the relative costs and benefits to the parties, the Justices defer to technocratic 
scientific risk regulation.164 Most recently, Bagenstos argues that the Court is 
more inclined to apply the ADA to those individuals with functional 
impainnents who are likely to become dependent on public assistance in the 
absence of protection.J65 Such an interpretation renders the Court's rulings 
consistent with the stated goals of the ADA when it was "sold" to Congress, 
and especially for the business interests represented therein.166 
Ill. THE JUSTICES AND THE WHOLE MAN 
Although valuable for raising a novel notion regarding the Supreme 
Court's treatment of people with disabilities, Crippled Justice suffers from 
three main flaws: The book neglects to properly develop the notions it 
presents; it tends towards carelessness in describing certain topics; and, most 
significantly, it is ultimately unconvincing. 
O'Brien proffers very provocative and interesting theories, but then fails to 
discuss these premises or their implications adequately.167 Examples of this 
faulty methodology include her assertions that the Court refused to grant wider 
disability rights through the provision of reasonable accommodations because 
of their cost,168 that the ADA satisfactorily "pieced together an amalgam of 
phrases to denote the qualifications for a constitutionally suspect 
classification,"169 and that the lower federal courts have ignored the guidance 
of both administrative agencies and Congress when interpreting disability-
related rights statutes.170 Each of these arguments contains valid, interesting 
points. Support for these assertions might have included, respectively, a 
discussion of how the ADA compares with other civil rights statutes, 
REv. 397 (2000). I qualify this statement because neither the holding in Murphy nor the 
dicta in Sutton fits this model. 
162. ld. Bagenstos coins this term to mean "[a]n understanding of disability as 
subordination." Jd. at 401. 
163. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk 
Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479 (2001). 
164. /d. 
165. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare 
Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. (forthcoming 2003). 
166. ld. 
167. A tendency that is also exhibited in an earlier publication. See RUTH O'BRIEN, 
WORKER'S PARADOX: THE REPUBLICAN ORIGINS OF NEW DEAL LABOR POLICY, 1886-1935 
(1998). 
168. P. 149 
169. P. 173. 
170. P. 176. 
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particularly as accommodation costs are concemed;171 the effect on ADA 
litigation that a clearer congressional endorsement of heightened constitutional 
classification 172 would have had; 173 and what disability jurisprudence would 
look like if the Court deferred either to congressional findings174 and/or to 
administrative regulations, especially in relation to the EEOC's interpretive 
guidelines.175 
An attendant difficulty presented by the book is that O'Brien's arguments 
suffer from imprecision.176 For example, in discussing Cleburne, O'Brien 
mistakenly characterizes Justice White's majority opinion as holding that the 
Court did not provide rational basis scrutiny for the law in question.177 Later 
on she states that the "zoning law failed to meet what White described as the 
minimal requirement of rationality required of any law."178 Likewise, Justice 
Brennan's opinion in Arline is castigated on the ground that in applying the 
"regarded as" prong of the Rehabilitation Act, he · condoned social 
stereotypes,l79 while Justice O'Connor is taken to task for not applying the 
ADA's identical "regarded as" provision in Sutton, thereby giving employers 
171. See Stein, supra note 64 (demonstrating the empirical inaccuracy of this postulate 
and the manner in which it has become received wisdom among many legal academics). 
172. In a nutshell, Congress specifically mentioned in its ADA findings that people 
with disabilities were "a discrete and insular minority" facing the "serious and pervasive 
social problem" of discrimination. It also noted that people with disabilities often have "no 
legal recourse to redress such discrimination" and are "relegated to a position of 
powerlessness in our society." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12,10l(a) (West 2002). This language clearly 
demonstrates Congressional intent to raise judicial scrutiny of laws concerning people with 
disabilities by drawing linguistic parallels to Justice Stone's footnote from United States v. 
Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Unfortunately, if that was Congress's 
intention, it was neither sufficiently explicit nor artful in its articulation. See Silvers & Stein, 
supra note 43 (arguing that in promulgating the ADA, Congress was attempting to rebut the 
framework established by the Supreme Court in Cleburne). 
173. Decided well after publication of Crippled Justice, the question is resounding in 
University of Alabama v. Garrett, 535 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Congress's application 
of the ADA to states as employers was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment 
for reasons of state sovereign immunity). 
174. See generally Ruth Colker & James Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. 
REv. 80 (2001). 
175. Lack of deference to those regulations has raised a hue and cry among some 
disability rights advocates, including O'Brien. More perplexing is the Court's selective use 
of administrative regulations, as described by Soifer, supra note 156. 
176. As do her footnotes. See, e.g., p. 108 n.235 (citing Rubin Klein, A History of 
Psychoanalysis in lieu of Reuben Fine, The History of Psychoanalysis, supra note 32); p. 
254 n.12 (attributing, incorrectly, usage of the word "inhumane" to Wyatt v. Stickey, 325 F. 
Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971)). More problematic are examples, such as the one in footnote 
74 on page 233, where it is unclear whether the arguments originate with O'Brien or the 
scholar she previously cited. 
177. P. 140. 
178. Pp. 142-43. 
179. P. 150. 
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free rein to discriminate on the basis of irrelevant characteristics.180 At times 
O'Brien switches back and forth between the Supreme Court and other courts, 
leaving readers (or at any rate, this one) confused as to which court held 
what.181 Similarly, O'Brien states both that the lower federal courts utilized 
the whole man schema in interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, 182 and also that 
their focus on qualification under the ADA was noveJ.183 Most egregious is 
O'Brien's basic misunderstanding of the applicable law. For instance, she is 
put off by the Court's willingness to extend ADA protection only to those 
individuals with substantial limitations, and takes umbrage at the Court's 
screening of disabled claimants based on their "qualified" status. 184 These 
standards, however, are drawn directly from the ADA's definition of disability. 
The adoption of this definition (and thus these standards) whole cloth from the 
Rehabilitation Act may have been an unfortunate choice for the reasons 
described above, 185 as well as for the procrustean manner in which they are 
applied.186 Nevertheless, in light of this definition's adaptation, these are 
categorically the appropriate standards to use. 
The central failing of Crippled Justice, however, is that O'Brien's thesis of 
the whole man schema is unconvincing. This is so for three main reasons. 
First, some of the cases cited are incongruent to her theory. Second, O'Brien's 
thesis is overly broad and therefore cannot be sustained. Third, the book does 
not specifically connect the normative whole man schema (as opposed to that 
of general bias) to the Court's actions. 
To begin with, several of the cases she cites as illustrative of application of 
the schema in fact do not conform to her thesis. Adherents to the epistemic 
rehabilitation community's trope, for example, would likely favor plaintiffs 
180. P. 194. Both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA define being disabled as having 
"(a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual, (b) a record of such an impairment; or (c) being regarded as 
having such an impairment." See 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 2002); 42 U.S.C.A. § 
12,102(2)(A)-(C) (West 2002). Congress extended the definition of disability to this group 
of functionally nondisabled individuals in order to combat erroneous but widespread cultural 
assumptions about people with "disabilities"-what the Supreme Court in School Board v. 
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283-84 (1987), a Rehabilitation Act decision, eloquently termed the 
"perception of disability based on myth, fear, or stereotype." See Michelle A. Travis, 
Leveling the Playing Field or Stacking the Deck? The "Unfair Advantage" Critique of 
Perceived Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L. REV. 901 (2000); Michelle A. Travis, Perceived 
Disabilities, Social Cognition, and "Innocent Mistakes," 55 VAND. L. REV. 481 (2002). 
181. Pp. 154-57. 
182. P. 150. 
183. Pp. 164-65. 
184. Pp. 177-92. 
185. See supra text accompanying notes 149-53. 
186. See Michael Ashley Stein, Foreword: Disability and Identity, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. (forthcoming 2003) (criticizing the Justices' ADA jurisprudence as resembling "a 
Jackie Mason comedy routine" for the way that it lurches to and fro in its determination of 
which claimants are "disabled" under the ADA). 
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with impairments who nonetheless managed to perform their jobs, especially 
when they did so without requesting special accommodation. Hallie 
Kirkingburg, who drove a truck using monocular vision,187 and Vaughan 
Murphy, who conveyed parcels despite his high blood pressure,188 are each 
primary examples of the type of disabled success stories that Rusk and Switzer 
advocated. Placed on a hypothetical Supreme Court bench, an epistemic 
rehabilitation community Justice would have ruled in each of these plaintiffs' 
favor. As it turns out, the Supreme Court went the other way. Thus, the whole 
man schema is not convincing as a determinate guide to resolving Supreme 
Court ADA decisions. 
Additionally, the logical extension of O'Brien's whole man thesis, wherein 
the only acceptable disabled workers are those who perform their duties 
without altering the workplace, is that no accommodation will be palatable to 
the Court. Although some disability rights advocates might agree with this 
assertion,189 I do not. While I am also aggrieved by much of the Court's ADA 
jurisprudence,190 O'Brien's core proposition, as stated, is simply too extreme. 
True, the Court has not yet granted certiorari in any case where a reasonable 
accommodation has been upheld, thus making it difficult to discern what they 
would consider a reasonable accommodation.I91 Yet ADA cases subsequent to 
Crippled Justice's publication indicate that the Court would consider some 
accommodations reasonable, even if the Justices are currently unwilling to 
elaborate upon the actual standard in either their rulings or dicta. For instance, 
in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,192 the Court held that a requested 
accommodation that conflicts with a seniority system is ordinarily 
unreasonable.193 Nevertheless, the Court ruled that an employee can show 
special circumstances where it is reasonable to make an exception to the 
seniority system, thus compelling the employer to grant an accommodation 
(here, reassignment).l94 In so doing, the Court rejected U.S. Airways' 
argument that any change to a "neutral" workplace rule is per se 
187. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 557 (1999). 
188. See Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516, 520 (1999). 
189. Perhaps therein lies the difficulty, for O'Brien seems to rely exclusively on 
assertions made by members of the disability rights movement, and in particular, some of the 
most political ones. While she is certainly entitled to do this, the resulting polemic often 
detracts from the force of her arguments. 
190. See generally Silvers & Stein, supra note 43; Silvers & Stein, supra note 150; 
Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Essentially Empirical: The Roles of Biological and 
Legal Classification in Effectively Prohibiting Genetic Discrimination, in SCIENCE AND 
OTHER CULTURES: ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (Robert Figueroa 
& Sandra Harding eds., forthcoming 2002); Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability 
and Paternalism at the Supreme Court (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) 
[hereinafter Silvers & Stein, Disability and Paternalism]; Stein, supra note 6:4. 
191. This point, a corollary to his "outlier" theory, is raised by Soifer, supra note 156. 
192. 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002). 
193. !d. at 1524. 
194. !d. at 1525. 
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unreasonable.195 And, although Justice Scalia's dissent determinedly argued 
for such an interpretation, the majority opinion unequivocally rejected it.196 
Thus, contrary to the whole man schema, circumstances do exist in which the 
Court seems at least receptive to the possibility of accommodating a worker 
with a disability.197 
Most detrimental to O'Brien's thesis is that she fails adequately to 
demonstrate why the normative whole man schema influenced the Court's 
interpretation of disability-related employment issues. This is primarily due to 
the overly ambitious scope of her thesis. At times O'Brien infers that the 
epistemic rehabilitation community's vision of disability held a hegemonic 
precedence in Cold War-era American culture.198 Certainly, her assertion that 
this period was also the heyday of psychoanalysis in that society is well 
taken.199 However, to be persuasive O'Brien would need to show that the 
Justices who lived through that period were acculturated by the intellectual 
milieu of psychoanalytic thinking; further, that as a result of this indoctrination 
they in tum absorbed the epistemic rehabilitation community's vision of 
disability. 
So global a view of the Justices' motivation is essential to O'Brien's thesis. 
It would not be sufficient, for example, to assert that the current Supreme 
Court's constricting view of disability-related rights is merely a corollary of 
their general aversion to expansive readings of civil rights laws.200 For 
although a very strong case has been (convincingly) made that the current 
conservative majority is hostile to antidiscrimination provisions and is engaged 
m an agenda to roll back civil rights,201 such a straightforward, politically 
195. Asserted by their counsel, Walter E. Dellinger, Ill, in briefing and at oral 
argument. Brief for Petitioner at 19, Barnett (No. 00-1250); Respondent's Oral Argument at 
47, Barnett (No. 00-1250). 
196. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1520-22. 
197. Parenthetically, the Court was also willing to be convinced in Cleveland v. Policy 
Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), that individuals with disabilities currently 
receiving public-assistance benefits after representing under oath that they were unable to 
perform any work could still make the case that they had been denied gainful employment. 
198. Pp. 28-29, 56, 87. 
199. P. 30. 
200. See Brent E. Simmons, The Invincibility of Constitutional Error: The Rehnquist 
Court's States' Rights Assault on Fourteenth Amendment Protections of Individual Rights, 
II SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 259 (2001). For commentaries on the Supreme Court's growing 
curtailment of disability rights, see Peter David Blanck & Michael Millender, Before 
Disability Civil Rights: Civil War Pensions and the Politics of Disability in America, 52 
ALA. L. REv. I, 2 (2000) (noting that the Supreme Court has "stubbornly resisted the 
conceptions of civil rights and anti-discrimination that are at the core of the ADA"). 
201. See Jack M. Beerrnann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty 
Years Later, 34 CoNN. L. REv. 981, 1028-29 (2002) (arguing that "overall the Court 
continues to be more conservative than Congress on civil rights, and applies statutory 
construction as a tool for combating Congress's civil rights agenda"); Colker & Brudney, 
supra note 174, at 123; Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Pretoria to Philadelphia: Judge 
Higginbotham's Racial Justice Jurisprudence on South Africa and the United States, 20 
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partisan claim does not explain why traditionally liberal Justices have 
frequently joined their counterparts.202 Consequently, to adequately prove the 
influence of the whole man schema of rehabilitation posited in her book, 
O'Brien needed to demonstrate the actual influence of this precept upon the 
Court's members. Had she done so, Crippled Justice would have presented a 
fascinating view of post-World War II American society, one seen through the 
lens of disability and employment. 
To be fair, successful treatments of the effect of larger intellectual milieus 
upon specific judges acting in particular circumstances are Herculean tasks, and 
thus justifiably rare.203 Two seminal examples of this type of jurisprudence, 
drawn from earlier periods of American legal history,204 are Robert Cover's 
analysis of why the Justices upheld the rights of slave owners as opposed to the 
human rights of slaves,205 and Morton HorWitz's explanation of the 
motivations of state court judges in stunting the growth of negligence liability 
during America's Industrial Revolution.206 Perhaps, then, Crippled Justice 
ought not to be judged by so lofty a standard. Nonetheless, while it is clear 
from the book why policymakers and government agency staffers might be 
influenced by the epistemic rehabilitation community's vision of disability, 
O'Brien does not explain why this would be true for any of the Justices. 
A more ecumenical assertion might be plausible. It could be argued, for 
instance, that the Court's perceptions are motivated by general social bias 
against people with disabilities. Such an explication could draw upon several 
different asseverations made by Disability Studies scholars.207 Harlan Hahn, to 
YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 383, 389 (2002) (highlighting that the conservative Supreme Court 
has eroded "civil rights recognized by the Warren Court"). 
202. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002) (Souter, J., for a 
unanimous Court); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) 
(O'Connor, J., for a unanimous Court); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 
(1999) (Souter, J., for a unanimous Court); Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (O'Connor, 
J., for the majority, including Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 
U.S. 471,494 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Cleveland v. PolicyMgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 
U.S. 795 (1999) (Breyer, J., for a unanimous Court). 
203. For an overview of this type of academic endeavor, see William W. Fisher Ill, 
Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of the Methodologies of 
Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1065 (1997). 
204. See also P.S. ATNAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979) 
(providing in-depth analysis of the intellectual, political, and economic milieu affecting 
contract law in nineteenth century England, and being, in my opinion, equally laudable). 
205. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS (1975). 
206. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960 
(1992). 
207. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 161, at 436 (summarizing the ADA's statutory 
findings that a disabled person's "obstacles result from society's prejudices, stereotyping, 
and neglect"); ChaiR. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination 
Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 91, 165 (2000) (asserting that the general public's view is that "disabled people lack value 
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name just one, asserts that able-bodied society feels "existential anxiety" 
towards the disabled.208 The combination of repugnance to disabled bodily 
difference and fear of also attaining such variation in the future, according to 
Hahn, result in a sociological desire to segregate people with disabilities from 
the mainstream.209 It also results in the Supreme Court's aversion to upholding 
disability-related rights.2IO 
In addition, a larger story can be told regarding the threat that disability 
accommodations pose to workplace hierarchies, and how they are viewed as a 
means of eroding employer control. This is a theme O'Brien hints at 
throughout the book, and even includes in her conclusion, but she does not 
examine it in any depth.211 It can be argued, for example, that current 
disability law resembles the abandoned, chauvinistic framework for 
determining sex equality.212 Consequently judges presume, based on 
unfounded stereotypes, that people with disabilities have a diminished 
capability to perform social functions (such as work) without grounding those 
assumptions in fact.213 Likewise, when confronted with disability 
discrimination claims, judges do not even perceive those assertions as having 
merit, much as they did not acknowledge parallel claims of sexual 
discrimination.214 Accordingly, the Justices will examine in depth the bases on 
which employers justify the exclusion of women from workplace opportunities 
(as they did in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,215 discussed below), but 
routinely accede to employers' stipulations on occupational necessity for 
denying disabled workers' labor market participation. 
Nor does the ruling in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,216 wherein the Court 
ruled that the fundamental nature of a professional golf tournament was not 
altered by allowing a disabled participant to use a golf cart, 217 detract from this 
argument. The Martin decision went to the issue of public accommodation 
under Title III of the ADA, rather than to an employer's duty under Title 1,218 
and are to be pitied"); Anita Silvers, The Unprotected: Constructing Disability in the Context 
of Antidiscrimination Law, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 19, at 133-34 (noting a history of 
bias against the disabled due to the "consequent burdens and dangers their presence in public 
posed both for them and for the common good"). 
208. See Hahn, supra note 23; Hahn, supra note 44. 
209. See Harlan Hahn, Antidiscrimination Laws and Social Research on Disability: 
The Minority Group Perspective, 14 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 41 (1996). 
210. See Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or Biased 
Reasoning?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 166, 182-91 (2000). 
211. See, e.g., pp. 201-02. 
212. See Silvers & Stein, supra note 43. 
213. Id. at 690. 
214. /d. at 676. 
215. 499 u.s. 187 (1991). 
216. 532 u.s. 661 (2001). 
217. /d. 
218. /d. 
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More significantly, it highlights that the Court is very selective about which 
activities it is willing to investigate the fundamental natures of.219 In the 
context of investigating the fundamental nature of job requirements, there is a 
clear divergence between the methodology applied to investigating exclusions 
based on sex from that utilized for disability.220 
The most recently decided Title I case, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Echazabal,22i holding that employers may exclude not only workers who pose 
dangers to others but also those who endanger themselves, nicely illustrates this 
contrast between the Court's treatment of sex and disability.222 The Echazabal 
Court explicated the harms that the plaintiff might cause only in terms of the 
potential costs (such as tort liability) that would be borne by the employer, 
rather than as those which might harm his own health.223 In stark contrast, the 
Court in Johnson Controls went to great length to explain that an employer's 
potential liability was not a valid consideration for precluding workplace 
opportunity for women.224 That Court, moreover, explicitly required an 
employer to demonstrate that "sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the 
employee's ability to perform the job" in order to justify its exclusionary 
policy.225 By comparison, the Justices in Echazaballeft the standard of proof 
unstated.226 Finally, the Echazabal Court noted that excluding disabled 
workers who were willing to hazard their own health avoided unfounded 
stereotypical judgments based on broad categories of the type utilized by the 
defendant in Johnson Controls.227 Accordingly, while the Court was willing to 
parse out the underlying motivation and justification for excluding women in 
Johnson Controls, it left those considerations untouched in Echazabal. 
CONCLUSION 
Crippled Justice's thesis is provocative and interesting. O'Brien proffers a 
novel theory in claiming that a whole man schema, originated by an epistemic 
rehabilitation community in Cold War America, continues to have a 
determinative effect upon the Supreme Court's ADA jurisprudence. Yet 
despite the freshness of this approach, O'Brien's thesis is ultimately 
219. For a parallel argument that the Court frequently lacks knowledge for making 
decisions and is therefore driven by political considerations in choosing some areas for 
judgment, see Frederick Schauer, The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Casey 
Martin, 2001 SUP. CT. REv. 267. 
220. See Silvers & Stein, Disability and Paternalism, supra note 190. The following 
discussion is drawn from this source. 
221. 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002). 
222. /d.; see also Silvers & Stein, Disability and Paternalism, supra note 190. 
223. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2052. 
224. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,208 (1991). 
225. /d. at 204. 
226. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 204 7 n.J. 
227. /d. at 2054 n.5 
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unconvincing. This is primarily due to her inability to demonstrate that the 
Justices who lived through the 1950s and 1960s were so indoctrinated by the 
intellectual milieu of psychoanalytic thinking that they continue to be 
influenced by that epistemic community's vision of disability. Nevertheless, 
the book provides a valuable service by raising a key question: Why is the 
Supreme Court (as well as the lower federal courts) averse to disability-related 
employment claims? Many answers can, and hopefully will, be 
forthcoming. 228 
228. See Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative 
Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 403 (1998) (reporting that a 
study by the ABA found over 92% of Title I cases were won by employers over the period 
1992-1997); see also Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for 
Defendants?, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999); Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (2001). 
